Islamic Republic of Iran Continues Pursuit of Nuclear Weapon, Expands Covert Activities
The Islamic Republic of Iran has continued its pursuit of obtaining a nuclear weapon by not only stockpiling enriched uranium to near-weapons grade purity but also expanding its covert activities in developing its weaponization capabilities. According to sources embedded in the Iranian regime and supplied to the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), Tehran has once again renewed efforts to advance its ability to detonate a nuclear weapon.
At the head of Iran’s detonators program is an organization known as METFAZ, or the Center for Research and Expansion of Technologies on Explosions and Impact. According to Alireza Jafarzadeh, deputy director of the NCRI in the US, METFAZ has expanded its activities and its main focus is on detonating a nuclear bomb.
Iran has at least a dozen sites across the country dedicated to nuclear development, weaponization, research, and heavy water production, but information suggests that there has been an increase in covert activity in at least two of these locations, including the Sanjarian site, which was once one of Iran’s top weaponization facilities.
Renewed activity has been reported at the Sanjarian site, which was once believed to be largely inactive between 2009 and late 2020. The site has been spotted with top nuclear experts and is believed to be operating under the front company known as Arvin Kimia Abzaar, which claims to be affiliated with the oil and gas industry.
METFAZ falls under Iran’s Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, which is widely known to security experts as the organization spearheading Iran’s nuclear development. The organization has previously attempted to conceal its EBW detonators program, a system first invented in the 1940s to deploy atomic warheads, under activities relating to the oil industry.
The IAEA has previously assessed that Iran’s detonator development is an integral part of a program to develop an implosion-type nuclear explosive device. Despite this, Iran has attempted to conceal its program, claiming that the detonator program was related to its aerospace industry and was needed to prevent explosive accidents.
The NCRI has confirmed that neither the Sanjarian site nor Parchin’s Plan 6 have ever been inspected by the IAEA. According to Jafarzadeh, the regime has used deceptive tactics to prevent any mechanism for verification and has yet to provide an opportunity or the means for the IAEA to have a satisfactory answer to its inquiries.
The regime’s layered approach to its nuclear program, which relies on networks operating under the guise of privately owned companies, false operations, and immense ambiguity, has made tracking Tehran’s nuclear program difficult for even agencies dedicated to nuclear security, like the IAEA. The NCRI’s revelation today shows that the regime has no transparency related to its program for building an atomic bomb and is moving towards building the bomb at a rapid pace.
